TRANSFORMANDO EM REALIDADE

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Retrieving Information from Malware Encrypted Output Files Two Case Studies from Brazil

ENS

Nelson Uto CPqD

Agenda

- Introduction.
- Cryptanalysis of File #1.

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- Cryptanalysis of File #2.
- Final words.

Introduction

- CPqD was hired by a big Brazilian company to find out which information had been stolen by three different malwares, that infected its environment.
- Each one of them stored information in encrypted form using different mechanisms.
- We did only have access to the encrypted files and the malware binaries, meaning we could not use the special purpose hardware targeted by them.
- Due to the sensitivity of the stolen data and signed NDA, this talk will not use the real information we retrieved from those files.

Covered topics

- Detection of weak cryptosystems.
- Cryptanalysis of classical algorithms.
- Block ciphers.
- DES.
- Modes of operation.
- Searching key in malware binary or in memory.
- Worst scenario.


File #1 – Sample

🔞 🛇 🔗 #01.enc - Gl	Нех																	
Arquivo Editar Ver Jane	elas Aju	ıda																
00000000A6	B7	Α7	69	94	89	AD	BB	B 3	72	9E	A8	69	97	8 E	AE	i	ri	
00000010BE	C1	BF	B0	B6	B2	BD	8 E	68	A2	94	95	A4	94	92	A2		h	J
0000002079	68	6F	6F	72	6F	62	69	6 E	40	68	6F	6F	72	6F	62	yhod	robin@hoorob	5
0000003069	6E	40	68	6F	6F	72	6F	62	69	6E	40	68	6F	6F	72	in@h	noorobin@hoor	-
000000406F	62	69	6E	89	BB	6F	B0	72	9B	A 3	BB	B5	85	68	9C	obir	no.rh.	
00000050BE	C5	B0	AB	AC	6E	6F	AE	6F	A 3	B7	B2	AA	B7	B7	83		.no.o	
00000060A9	BB	7B	72	55	D7	6 E	22	23	B5	28	9B	F6	E6	ЗA	59	{r	⁻ ሀ.n"#.(:እ	(
00000070D7	5A	E0	12	44	CD	4D	0A	31	DF	F2	4 C	96	DE	3B	17	.Z.	D.M.1L;.	
0000008038	7B	31	37	D4	06	23	F4	89	D4	E2	26	40	C2	1A	ЗA	8{17	/#&@:	:
000000903C	0A	41	FC	8 A	6C	68	6F	6F	72	6F	62	69	6 E	40	68	<.A.	.lhoorobin@h	1
000000A06F	6F	72	6F	62	69	6 E	40	68	6F	6F	72	6F	62	69	9E	oord	bin@hoorobi.	
000000B092	B7	B2	B4	B6	C4	B4	AA	BA	40	89	BD	B3	72	9F	AA		@r	
000000C0C2	C1	89	AB	B0	BB	72	92	B1	B7	C2	92	B7	BB	C2	72		r	-
000000D0A3	AA	AA	C 2	40	9B	B4	B4	BD	C2	62	9D	BD	40	98	C1		@b@	
000000E0BE	C6	B4	A5	BD	6 E	74	B0	B4	6F	95	BE	B0	AF	B7	84		.nto	
000000F0AD	BD	С3	BB	B0	AE	B2	C2	99	74	43	85	30	75	EE	79		tC.0u.y	/ <u>_</u>
8 bits com sinal:	-90				32 b	its com	sinal:		177	259920	6		H	lexade	cimal:		A6	
8 bits sem sinal:	166				32 b	its sem	sinal:		177	259920	6		(Octal:			246	5
16 bits com sinal:	-18522				Flut	uante d	e 32 bit	s:	2.53	34473e	+25		E	Binário:			10100110	
16 bits sem sinal:	47014				Flut	uante d	e 64 bit	s:	-3.1	27396e	-21		1	Tamanh	o do flu	xo:	8	▲ ▼
🧭 Mo	ostrar de	codifica	ição litt	le endia	in						Mostra	ar núme	eros sen	n sinal (e flutua	ntes como	hexadecimal	
Deslocamento: 0																		

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File #1 – Histogram



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File #1 – Important facts

- File#1 is pretty redundant.
 - This means a weak cryptosystem was used.
- The distance between occurrences of the string "robin@hoo" is always multiple of its length.
- Most of the bytes has values between 80 and 180.

File #1 – Hypothesis

- **Hypothesis #1:** a constant number is added to each byte modulo 256 and a given string is repeated several times in the plain text.
 - Not likely, but it should be tested.
 - How?
- **Hypothesis #2:** a Vigenère cipher over an alphabet of 256 elements and period equals 9 was used.
 - Candidate key: robin@hoo

File #1 – First attempt

🛛 😣 📀 📀 #01.decl-(GHex																			
Arquivo Editar Ver Jane	elas Aju	ıda																		
00000000 3 4	48	45	00	26	49	45	4 C	44	00	2F	46	00	29	4E	46	4HE.	&IELD)./F	.)NF	
000000104F	52	4D	41	54	49	4F	4 E	00	33	25	23	35	32	29	34	ORMA	TION.	3%#	52)4	ł
0000002039	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	9				
0000003000	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00					
0000004000	00	00	00	49	53	00	41	00	2C	41	52	47	45	00	2D		IS.A.	, AR	GE	•
000000504F	53	41	49	43	00	2F	46	00	34	45	43	48	4 E	49	43	OSAI	C./F.	4EC	HNIC	2
0000006041	4C	<mark>0</mark> C	00	E6	75	05	B4	E3	4D	B9	2C	84	77	D8	F0	AL	.u	Μ.,	.w	
0000007069	1A	78	A 3	D5	5B	DE	A8	<mark>C8</mark>	71	B2	E4	27	6F	C9	A 8	i.x.	.[q	'o	
00000080D6	12	C3	F7	6C	97	B4	82	1A	72	79	B8	00	5A	AB	СВ		ι	ry.	.Z	
00000090CA	9B	DF	93	1C	2C	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		. ,			
0000000A000	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	30				0)
000000B052	4F	43	45	44	55	52	41	4C	00	21	4 E	44	00	30	48	ROCE	DURAL	!N	D.0H	ł
000000C059	53	49	43	41	4C	00	23	4F	4 E	54	52	4F	4 C	53	00	YSIC	AL.#C	NTR	OLS.	
000000D034	48	41	54	00	33	45	45	4B	53	00	34	4F	00	30	52	4HAT	.3EEk	(S.4	0.0F	2
000000E04F	54	45	43	54	00	34	48	45	00	23	4F	4E	46	49	44	0TEC	T.4HE	. #0	NFID)
000000F045	4E	54	49	41	4C	49	54	59	0C	D4	16	BE	06	8C	10	ENTI	ALITY	·		
8 bits com sinal:	52				32 b	its com	sinal:		454	0468			H	Hexade	cimal:		34			
8 bits sem sinal:	52				32 b	its sem	sinal:		454	0468				Octal:			064			
16 bits com sinal:	18484				Flut	uante d	e 32 bit	s:	6.36	52551e-	39			Binário:			00110100			_
16 bits sem sinal:	18484				Flut	uante d	e 64 bit	s:	2.67	72255e-	+59		1	Tamanh	o do flu	xo:	8			×
🥥 Mo	ostrar de	codifica	ição litt	le endia	an						Mostra	ar núme	eros ser	n sinal (e flutua	ntes como	hexadecima	al		
Deslocamento: 0																				

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File #1 – Correction

🔞 🛇 🔗 #01.dec2 - 0	iHex															
Arquivo Editar Ver Jane	las Aju	da														
0000000054	68	65	20 20	46	69	65	6C	64	20	4F	66	20	49	6E	66	The Field Of Inf
000000106F	72	6D	61	74	69	6F	6 E	20	53	45	43	55	52	49	54	ormation SECURIT
0000002059	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	Υ
0000003020	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	
0000004020	20	20	20	69	73	20	61	20	4 C	61	72	67	65	20	4D	is a Large M
000000506F	73	61	69	63	20	4F	66	20	54	65	63	68	6E	69	63	osaic Of Technic
0000006061	6C	2C	20	06	95	25	D4	03	6D	D9	4 C	A4	97	F8	10	al,%m.L
0000007089	ЗA	98	C 3	F5	7B	FE	C8	E8	91	D2	04	47	8F	E9	C8	.:{G
00000080F6	32	E3	17	8C	B7	D4	A2	ЗA	92	99	D8	20	7A	CB	EB	.2 z
00000090EA	BB	FF	B3	3C	4 C	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	<l< td=""></l<>
000000A020	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	50	Р
000000B072	6F	63	65	64	75	72	61	<mark>6</mark> C	20	41	6 E	64	20	50	68	rocedural And Ph
0000000079	73	69	63	61	6C	20	43	6F	6 E	74	72	6F	6C	73	20	ysical Controls
000000D054	68	61	74	20	53	65	65	6 B	73	20	54	6F	20	50	72	That Seeks To Pr
000000E06F	74	65	63	74	20	54	68	65	20	43	6F	6 E	66	69	64	otect The Confid
000000F065	6E	74	69	61	6C	69	74	79	2C	F4	36	DE	26	AC	30	entiality,.6.&.0
8 bits com sinal:	84				32 b	its com	sinal:		543	516756)	Hexade	cimal:	54
8 bits sem sinal:	84				32 b	its sem	sinal:		543	516756				Octal:		124
16 bits com sinal:	its com sinal: 26708						e 32 bit	s:	1.94	43157e-	19			Binário:		01010100
16 bits sem sinal:	16 bits sem sinal: 26708 FI								1.44	1612e-	+214		Tamanho do fluxo: 8			xo: 8
🥥 Mo	strar de	codifica	ıção litt	le endia	n						Mostra	ar núme	eros sei	m sinal	e flutua	ntes como hexadecimal
Deslocamento: 0																

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File #1 – Description of cipher

- Alphabet of definition: $A = \{0, 1, 2, 3, ..., 255\}$
- **Plain text:** $M = m_0 m_1 m_2 ... m_{t-1}, m_i \in A$
- **Cipher text:** $C = c_0 c_1 c_2 \dots c_{t-1}, c_i \in \mathcal{A}$

• **Key:**
$$K = k_0 k_1 k_2 k_3 k_4 k_5 k_6 k_7 k_8$$

= 0x52 4f 42 49 4e 20 48 4f 4f

- Encryption function: $c_i = m_i + k_{(i \mod 9)} \mod 256$
- **Decryption function:** $m_i = c_i k_{(i \mod 9)} \mod 256$

File #2 – Sample

😣 😔 🔗 🛛 esruser@ubuntu: /tmp

Arquivo Editar Ver Terminal Ajuda

esruser@ubuntu:/tmp\$ cat \#02.enc iPlKR5LehJf6FP4sWSDmQvY07PcZjZi5WSvk287c2/UU5N2mC+vaqZvA7LVuJZm4+UMyAlDUwZDqFXKC 3GcMBeyAnRw/fi1WX7UpAM0VU8Pb0op8yMTYw6w9E06xcf84Zrduknf2B54=8KmM0BLFRQM7jGzCWhGv 1wt79lX0c0FNc7DDGqKu31Y=6LDPjUYL77UjPcCYB5KoVEcNnoMRB7dHFYAfPP7xl64aRRquDDjwcPcu Awq97cpwpThzD0GZQww9n66rnFkuS8kZ35GjzM68RYGeRHdLQrU=napjM3ySbBAHHs3XQub+uh/Gbn6W rCKs+oqXXWgdLg0=q17TBIooNpbFCDxKVp3D7WvF2Zp8Vzq5mcbcjEhzH7cwLz9eEo/o0gCZfH4xJTmn 2b//uSpLcKwz3bVBZ9FBdNHERICThgTbzu/buXDSM5Q=CmOmIiwcR6MxFsRoEtwOSUTZpVLardwtd9U8 Qoc3TK2tKQd4ybR2jsawGhWb5FKQ1eYLYnQnxQm0wuf7r0jTLKWNcU8w65V/QJnttWl6umYLGGCGVa/3 I4CG6N2yBNssv9GN1ig0B60=NcSrmv7CWtuSg1Lr7xhodbpffhsSLwgyJTgUhKjSGwcWPVN5aga2CT1g w+Adv2ERx6YBo0s1c60cfFVVYTetB9BBWDa6QPVriTVi2jy9av8=s88S2fScw6j14DeS+e6f/0SjhEAU W79h8KNrNKomocybmRPXmL0v9A==KtY0/kFWbjhYvyw7S/+4qEkHD7CtQT16MTK4feCHE2bZv/+5Kktw rJ4/KNtu0uiUi1/CXv6pmDVCd0F4hEePCyGHqZg0Nr74VJ8STq8r6xE5Rfkyyxb50ALSN7BFevkMGckn PmBMZt8=uQaZXZJBi3Bzn8Wq9idlGFW/YFjcjixaHpbqfZEPbFqq25Tg7lH0eQHDbh0+EZ/MP7PPS7bY k7KeuE2pNmG3jQ==7xUECpPc+BRLeCoAIowm1v53CxdNuTTvHxwY5swFN/5YBs0z0ci14ySDtMMQfQIZ Rmg4k9W5oZeBjVm01JoD08X4eg4CU71cl32K1R6g24s3Mu7B5mpDuZ8rHGXgMJCV06zI+BHiudg=ce3p +chcBF4j6r3S62ZhJotxw6dyPNheNW/MZA8J2uFZ28+Z/BAC9CmQrSVap/vzkYH/Np42Igo=EMIWBaVd hGKQXhn0P1cj2kl2dCrUrRlKQ0bhxlmaxLB08nWGF6LKDZ1Rj3oGt4SiuVFBo7+qMKy5rVe01PcLtfeA qjqKMyqKHkW+WQ64iSfHSpjGmxa5WqV4UqIdAk6zzCoVDxE74Kq=Gu0ykJleh6Eo/04YvT3RaRuP9EG6 tDKCOUt7BZD6qn/zNjpcgafW86btfD1yQ4U0s5LYeqvo6g4n02xgQchLGl8Vk0lKca/l3yauFS75SQHZ ypK3JMFhwIHft6ezQqqaSGN6BHydViL7+byddhxkSjVI9LrSrdoKKeAJQEAnblvJ4fAtpolL7csXnDUT XXjQruiCjPOtH3CAgowP43pm00/7BxDFahN2l7aJ4HV2lyOcum46dLLtfw==jRk2ZM/mHKNEwNSNMQnC F1IHTCT9CrSqMKNia5p3h1CWlrdp8rlAqA==HoQDqALw5wH6aBd4pFGHMGSJ2HrYGCmWoODuNME8PjU= nhm70YsfD0FQF3tPjrR+SAHbMNPLK4r7+0235tGnJ6M=pKDYE0nJANykBsKH27D1haKnNJGzT30yH038 KcCBunsHbpgGruwLJQmGuPNsg32/WSvk287c2/U=fKkTSiBlVVDpoNU/9g+U8FSlK1cT++idbRUQ344a

File #2 – Base64 decoded

😣 🛇 🔗 #02.decode	d - GHe	x														
Arquivo Editar Ver Jane	elas Aju	ıda														
000000008 <mark>8</mark>	F9	4A	47	92	DE	84	97	FA	14	FE	2C	59	20	E6	42	JG,Y.B
00000010F6	34	EC	F7	19	8D	98	B9	59	2B	E4	DB	CE	DC	DB	F5	.4Y+
0000002014	E4	DD	A6	0B	EB	DA	81	9B	C 0	EC	B5	6 E	25	99	B8	n%
00000030F9	43	32	02	50	D4	C1	90	EA	15	72	82	DC	67	0C	05	.C2.Prg
00000040EC	80	9D	10	3F	7E	2D	56	5F	B5	29	00	CD	15	53	С3	?~-V)S.
00000050DB	D2	8 A	7C	<mark>C8</mark>	C4	D8	C 3	AC	3D	10	EE	B1	71	FF	38	=q.8
0000006066	B7	6E	92	77	F6	07	9E	F0	A9	8C	38	12	C5	45	03	f.n.w8E.
000000703B	8C	6C	C2	5A	11	AF	D7	0B	7B	F6	55	F4	73	41	4D	;.l.Z{.U.sAM
0000008073	B0	С3	1A	A2	AE	DF	56	E8	B0	CF	8D	46	0B	EF	B5	sVF
0000009023	3D	C0	98	07	92	A8	54	47	0D	9E	83	11	07	B7	47	#=G
000000A015	80	1F	3C	FE	F1	97	AE	1A	45	1A	AE	0C	38	F0	70	<e8.p< td=""></e8.p<>
000000B0F7	2E	03	0A	BD	ED	CA	70	A5	38	73	0C	E1	99	43	0C	p.8sC.
000000C03D	9F	AE	AB	9C	59	2E	4 B	C9	19	DF	91	A3	СС	CE	BC	=Y.K
000000D045	81	9E	44	77	4B	42	B5	9D	AA	63	33	7C	92	6C	10	EDwKBc3 .l.
000000E007	1E	CD	D7	42	E6	FE	BA	1F	C6	6 E	7E	96	AC	22	AC	Bn~".
000000F0FA	8 A	97	5D	68	1D	2E	0D	AB	5E	D3	04	8 A	28	36	96]h^(6.
8 bits com sinal:	-120				32 k	oits com	n sinal:		119	9609588	30			Hexade	ecimal:	88
8 bits sem sinal:	136				32 k	oits sem	sinal:		119	9609588	30			Octal:		210
16 bits com sinal:	-1656				Flut	uante d	le 32 bit	ts:	5.1	96153e	+04			Binário	c .	10001000
16 bits sem sinal:	63880				Flut	uante d	le 64 bit	ts:	-2.2	233486	e-195			Tamanl	ho do flu	uxo: 8
🖬 M	ostrar de	ecodifica	ação litt	le endi	an					(Most	rar núm	eros se	m sinal	e flutua	antes como hexadecimal
Deslocamento: 0																

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
File #2 – Redundancy check

😣 🛇 🔗 🛛 esruser@ubuntu: /tmp

Arquivo Editar Ver Terminal Ajuda

esruser@ubuntu:/tmp\$ ls -l \#02.decoded -rw-r--r- 1 esruser esruser 2032 2012-06-07 11:12 #02.decoded esruser@ubuntu:/tmp\$ gzip \#02.decoded esruser@ubuntu:/tmp\$ ls -l *gz -rw-r--r- 1 esruser esruser 2067 2012-06-07 11:12 **#02.decoded.gz** esruser@ubuntu:/tmp\$

File #2 – Base64 review




0

File #2 – Block size?



File #2 – Block size clarification

56 Base64 Characters



File #2 – Candidate ciphers

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- DES.
- 2TDES.
- 3TDES.
- FEAL.
- IDEA.
- SAFER.
- RC5.
- LOKI.
- Blowfish.

File #2 – String search

esruser@ubuntu: /tmp Arquivo Editar Ver Terminal Ajuda	
esruser@ubuntu:/tmp\$ strings Portsys.exe.malware gre esruser@ubuntu:/tmp\$ strings Portsys.exe.malware gre esruser@ubuntu:/tmp\$ strings Portsys.exe.malware gre E Cipher Exception	ep -i "crypto"
Lb Cipher esruser@ubuntu:/tmp\$ strings Portsys.exe.malware gre I Des ignerNotify Des ignSize	ep -i "DES"
I Des ignerHook,(A po Des igned poDefault po Des ktopCenter	
dm Des ktop dmPrimary On Des troyT	
Get <mark>Des</mark> ktopWindow DestroyWindow	
DestroyMenu	
DestroyIcon	
DestroyCursor ImageList Destroy ▶	
esruser@ubuntu:/tmp\$ strings Portsys.exe.malware gre	
esruser@ubuntu:/tmp\$ strings Portsys.exe.malware gre esruser@ubuntu:/tmp\$	ep -i "blowfish"

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
File #2 – Narrowing the options

- LbCipher is a library for Delphi.
- It implements the following algorithms from our list:
 - Blowfish (ECB, CBC).
 - DES (ECB, CBC).
 - 2TDES (ECB, CBC).
 - 3TDES (ECB, CBC).

File #2 – Starting with DES

- DES is a 64-bit block cipher.
- The cipher employs a 64-bit key of which only 56 bits are effective.
- Based on a Feistel network.
- It is possible to search the entire key space using special purpose hardware¹, which was first built in 1998.

File #2 – Inside DES (1)



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File #2 – Inside DES (2)

			II)			
58	50	42	34	26	18	10	2
60	52	44	36	28	20	12	4
62	54	46	38	30	22	14	6
64	56	48	40	32	24	16	8
57	49	41	33	25	17	9	1
59	51	43	35	27	19	11	3
61	53	45	37	29	21	13	5
63	55	47	39	31	23	15	7

			IP) -1			
40	8	48	16	56	24	64	32
39	7	47	15	55	23	63	31
38	6	46	14	54	22	62	30
37	5	45	13	53	21	61	29
36	4	44	12	52	20	60	28
35	3	43	11	51	19	59	27
34	2	42	10	50	18	58	26
33	1	41	9	49	17	57	25

Figure: DES initial permutation and inverse.

File #2 – Inside DES (3)

		l	Ŧ				l	D	
32	1	2	3	4	5	16	7	20	21
4	5	6	7	8	9	29	12	28	17
8	9	10	11	12	13	1	15	23	26
12	13	14	15	16	17	5	18	31	10
16	17	18	19	20	21	2	8	24	14
20	21	22	23	24	25	32	27	3	9
24	25	26	27	28	29	19	13	30	6
28	29	30	31	32	1	22	11	4	25

Figure: DES round function expansion E and permutation P.

File #2 – Inside DES (4)

			PC1			
57	49	41	33	25	17	9
1	58	50	42	34	26	18
10	2	59	51	43	35	27
19	11	3	60	52	44	36
	abov	e for (C_i ; be	low fo	or D_i	
63	55	47	39	31	23	15
7	62	54	46	38	30	22
14	6	61	53	45	37	29
21	13	5	28	20	12	4

		PC	22		
14	17	11	24	1	5
3	28	15	6	21	10
23	19	12	4	26	8
16	7	27	20	13	2
41	52	31	37	47	55
30	40	51	45	33	48
44	49	39	56	34	53
46	42	50	36	29	32

Figure: DES key schedule bit selections.

File #2 – From LbCipher

procedure InitEncryptDES(const Key : TKey64;

var Context : TDESContext; Encrypt : Boolean);

const

PC1 : array [0..55] of Byte = (56, 48, 40, 32, 24, 16, 8, 0, 57, 49, 41, 33, 25, 17, 9, 1, 58, 50, 42, 34, 26, 18, 10, 2, 59, 51, 43, 35, 62, 54, 46, 38, 30, 22, 14, 6, 61, 53, 45, 37, 29, 21, 13, 5, 60, 52, 44, 36, 28, 20, 12, 4, 27, 19, 11, 3); PC2 : array [0..47] of Byte = (13, 16, 10, 23, 0, 4, 2, 27, 14, 5, 20, 9, 22, 18, 11, 3, 25, 7, 15, 6, 26, 19, 12, 1, 40, 51, 30, 36, 46, 54, 29, 39, 50, 44, 32, 47, 43, 48, 38, 55, 33, 52, 45, 41, 49, 35, 28, 31);

File #2 – Next steps

- Load the malware in OllyDbg.
- Search for PC1 and use it to locate the address of InitEncryptDES, if present.
- Set a breakpoint in that address.
- Run the malware.
- Extract the key from the first parameter.

File #2 – Finding PC1 (1)

Address	Hey	c du	mp						ASCII		<u>^</u>
00451000	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00			
00451008	02	8D	40	00	00	00	00	00	□□@		
00451010	00	00	00	00	00	-	00				
00451018	00	00	00	00	00	0			ing to search for		
00451020	32	13	8B	C0	02	0	SCII	80<	t ►]	
00451028	00	8D	40	00	00	8 ^เ	JNICODE]	
00451030	00	8D	40	00	01	8	1EX +06	38 3	0 28 20 18 10		
00451038	00	00	00	00	00	0		L			
00451040	28	21	40	00	в8	2	💌 Entire	block	<	× >>	
00451048	38	26	40	00	00		Case s			OK Cancel	
00451050	C9	D7	CF	C8	$^{\rm CD}$	CE	DB	D8	E×IEIIUØ		
00451058	DA	D9	CA	DC	DD	DE	DF	Ε0	ÚÙÊÜÝ₽₿à		
00451060	E1	E3	00	E4	E 5	8D	40	00	áã.äå⊡@.		
00451068	45	72	72	6F	72	00	8B	C0	Error.<À		
00451070	50	75	65	74	60	£Ρ	65	20	Puntimo		×

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File #2 – Finding PC1 (2)

Address	Hey	c di	amp						ASCII	^
00451E48	38	30	28	20	18	10	08	00	80(🗆 🗆 .	
00451E50	39	31	29	21	19	11	09	01	91)!00.0	
00451E58	3A	32	2A	22	1A	12	0A	02	:2*"00.0	
00451E60	3B	33	2В	23	3E	36	2E	26	;3+#>6.&	
00451E68	1E	16	0E	06	3D	35	2D	25	0000=5-8	
00451E70	1D	15	0D	05	3C	34	2C	24	□□.□<4,\$	
00451E78	1C	14	0C	04	1B	13	0В	03		
00451E80	0D	10	0A	17	00	04	02	1B	.0.0.000	
00451E88	0E	05	14	09	16	12	0В	03		
00451E90	19	07	OF	06	1A	13	0C	01	00000.0	
00451E98	28	33	1E	24	2E	36	1D	27	(3□\$.6□'	
00451EA0	32	2C	20	2F	2В	30	26	37	2, /+0&7	
00451EA8	21	34	2D	29	31	23	1C	1F	!4-)1#□□	
00451EB0	01	02	04	06	08	0A	0C	0E		
00451709	ΔΕ	11	12	15	17	10	1 D	10		~

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File #2 – References

Ad	dress	He	x dump					ASCII			0012FF	C4	7C817077 F
00	451E48	38	30 28	20 1	B 10	08	00	80(🗆 🗆 🗆 .			0012FF	'C8	00000001
00	451E50	39	31 29	21 1	9 11	09	01	91)!00.0			0012FF	CC	00000000
00	O C References in Portsys_:CODE to 00451E4800451E4D												
00	Addres	s	Disass	embly						Comme	ent		<u>^</u>
00	0044E1	36	MOV ES	I,Por	tsys	.0	045	1E48		00451	1E48=Ports	ys_	.00451E48
00						_						_	
00													
00													
00													
00													
00													
00				ĺ									
00					To 1	find	l re	ferences	to PC1, w	'e			
00					nee	d t	0.5	elect its fi	rst byte				~
00	151000	0F	11 12	15 1				d press C					

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File #2 - Beginning of the function

P7

C CPU - main thread, module Portsys_										
0044E11B	L.	C3	RETN	Beginning of	<u>~</u>					
0044E11C	Г\$	53	PUSH EBX	procedure						
0044E11D	.	56	PUSH ESI	InitEncryptDES						
0044E11E	.	57	PUSH EDI	·····						
0044E11F	.	55	PUSH EBP							
0044E120	.	81C4 74FFFFFF	ADD ESP,-8C							
0044E126	.	884C24 08	MOV BYTE PTR SS	:[ESP+8],CL						
0044E12A	. 895424 04 MOV DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+4],EDX									
0044E12E	.	MOV DWORD PTR SS:[ESP],EAX								
0044E131		B9 38000000	MOV ECX,38							
0044E136		BE 481E4500	MOV ESI, Portsys	00451E48						
0044E13B	.	8D4424 1C	LEA EAX,DWORD P	TR SS:[ESP+1C]						
0044E13F	>	0FB63E	CMOVZX EDI, BYTE	PTR DS:[ESI]						
0044E142	.	8BD7	MOV EDX,EDI							
0044E144	•	81E2 07000080	AND EDX,800000	07						
0044E14A	•	,79 O5	JNS SHORT Port	sys0044E151						
0044E14C		4A	DEC EDX		~					
00451E48=Portsys00451E48										

File #2 – Running the malware

C CPU - main thread	l, mod	dule Portsys_						
0044E11B	L.	C3	RETN					
0044E11C	⊏\$	53	PUSH EBX					
0044E11D	.	56	PUSH ESI					
0044E11E	.	57	PUSH EDI					
0044E11F	.	55	PUSH EBP					
0044E120	.	81C4 74FFFFFF	ADD ESP,-8C					
0044E126	.	884C24 08	MOV BYTE PTR SS:[ESP+8],CL					
0044E12A	.	895424 04	MOV DWORD PTR SS: [ESP+4], EDX					
0044E12E		890424	MOV DWORD PTR SS: [ESP], EAX					
0044E131		Backup Copy	MOV ECX,38					
0044E136	.	Binary Assemble Space	MOV ESI, Portsys .00451E48					
0044E13B	.	Label :	LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS: [ESP+1C]					
0044E13F	>	Comment ; Breakpoint •	Toggle F2 E PTR DS:[ESI]					
0044E142	.	Hit trace	Conditional Shift+F2 Conditional log Shift+F4					
0044E144	.	New origin here Ctrl+Gray *	Run to selection F4 0007					
0044E14A	.	Go to 🔶 🕨	Memory, on access tsys .0044E151					
0044E14C		Follow in Dump View call tree Ctrl+K	Memory, on write					
		Search for	Hardware, on execution					
Adamaaa	TTo	Find references to	ASCII O012FFC					
	He	Copy to executable						
00451E48	38	Analysis						
00451E50	39	Bookmark						
00451E58	3A	Appearance •	0012FFD					

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File #2 – Which parameter?

Remember the procedure signature is as follows:
 procedure InitEncryptDES (

const Key : TKey64;

var Context : TDESContext;

Encrypt : Boolean);

• **TKey64** definition:

TKey64 = array [0..7] of Byte;

• A **TKey64** value can not be stored by a single register in a 32-bit architecture.

File #2 – Calling convention

- Delphi's calling convention (left-to-right):
 - 1st parameter: EAX.
 - 2nd parameter: EDX.
 - 3rd parameter: ECX.
 - Remaining parameters: stack.

File #2 – Key address

Req	istei	rs (FI	2U)			<	<
EAX	00453C04		Portsy	/s00453C04			
ECX	00453C01		Ports	/s00453C01			
EDX	EDX 0012FB4B						
EBX	EBX 009877BC						
ESP	ESP 0012FB38						
EBP	0012	2FBD8					
ESI	0098	877EC					
EDI	0041	12430	Portsys00412430				
EIP	0044	4E11C	Ports	/s0044E11C			
C 1	ES	0023	32bit	O (FFFFFFFF)			
P 1	CS	001B	32bit	0 (FFFFFFFF)			
A 0	SS	0023	32bit	0 (FFFFFFFF)			
Z 0	DS	0023	32bit	O (FFFFFFFF)			
S 0	FS	003B	32bit	7FFDF000(FFF)			
т О	GS	0000	NULL				
D 0							

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File #2 – Key value

Address	Hey	c di	mp						ASCII	
00453C04	C2	4F	A0	10	74	4E	В1	53	ÂO □tN±S	
00453C0C	FF	FF	FF	FF	00	00	00	00	ÿÿÿÿ····	
00453C14	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		
00453C1C	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		
00453C24	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		
00453C2C	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		
00453C34	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		
00453C3C	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		
00453C44	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		
00453C4C	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		
00453C54	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		
00453C5C	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		
00453C64	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		
00453C6C	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		
00452074	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		×

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File #2 – Description of cipher

- Encryption algorithm: DES.
- Mode of operation: ECB.
- **Key:** *K* = 0xc24fa010744eb153

Alternative for finding keys

- A properly generated key is entropic.
- Information, on the other hand, is structured.
- Based on those facts, in 1999, Shamir and Someren³ proposed a way of finding stored keys.
- The basic idea is to traverse memory and identify the region with more entropy.
- One way of doing that is to set a window size and count the number of different elements on each window.

File #3 – Sample

50E96823#0851CDA207333E24 1.0.6 St - P: 6 R: 11

CFT:1.0.2

PA: 3

C3@158BF7627CD2750FF53D7288C863F7C7041221CD8E77B6A7F7833815075091A 23EB3ADA2352ADFE9514952DE6DF8B619D41E51DFB7C0196A104F994920E243471 6699DEF0DA48E624CEC0953F7BE159E0B43F3862C4A8D8FE1476F7939F72F99A04 9CAC2DC1DE0E6BB91066FF3E920283A373E8B94DF3D39F06FCB6A29B9E5DCF20A 0D02DE8F288F5C2737D1D64E1E25AA51A42C0AAE3ABFE354EBCE781342A6D8441 3391F4038EDB213AA87870D25FC06DD05DBF3EEB684665A7E20C080F196BA42D96 CFE0FA08FF64FF9B3C08CA3765768EDCBEDF620562ADB442C6A1191A1A137E50C 7F75C629AEB702F09F81107

PF: 3

50E96832#K@881A6DC9E4470F

50E96837#K@06BB

50E9683C#K@3FE759EE

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- [2] Menezes, A., van Oorschot, P, and Vanstone, S., Handbook of Applied Cryptography, CRC Press, 2001.
- [3] Shamir, A. and van Someren, N., *Playing "Hide and Seek" with Stored Keys*, in FC'99 Proc. of the 3rd Intl. Conference on Financial Cryptography, 1999.



Thank you for listening! Questions?

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